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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
PATRICK R. DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOHN C. DURFEE; DELTA VALLEY 
FOODS, a Utah corporation; 
LARRY HOWELL; UTAH POWER & 
LIGHT COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; and ABCO 
CONSTRUCTION CORP., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendants/Respondents 
CASE NO. 890454 
PRIORITY 13 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT PATRICK DONAHUE'S BRIEF IN 
OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENT HOWELL'S PETITION 
FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should this Court grant a writ of certiorari to review 
the Court of Appeals decision holding that the "open and 
obvious danger" rule, applied as an absolute bar to recovery, 
is anachronistic and inappropriate in light of the adoption and 
application of Utah's comparative negligence scheme? 
REPORT OF OPINION 
The subject decision has been published in 118 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 64 (Ct. App. filed September 28, 1989); slip op. No. 
8800227-CA. 
JURISDICTION 
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on 
September 28, 1989. Plaintiff/appellant Donahue does not 
dispute the Court's jurisdiction to review the Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari. 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1973)r1 
Contributory negligence shall not bar 
recovery in an action by any person or his 
legal representative to recover damages for 
negligence or gross negligence resulting in 
death or in injury to person or property, if 
such negligence was not as great as the 
negligence or gross negligence of the person 
against whom recovery is sought, but any 
damages allowed shall be diminished in the 
proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person recovering. As 
used in this act, "contributory negligence" 
includes "assumption of the risk." 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1973):l 
The court may, and when requested by 
any party shall, direct the jury to find 
separate special verdicts determining 
(1) the total amount of damages suffered and 
(2) the percentage of negligence 
attributable to each party; and the court 
shall then reduce the amount of the damages 
in proportion to the amount of negligence 
attributable to the person seeking recovery. 
1
 The controlling provisions of law are stated as enacted at 
the time of plaintiff's injuries. These provisions have since 
been repealed and reenacted in a manner which eliminated joint 
and several liability but which does not otherwise alter the 
rationale urged by Donahue or adopted by the Court of Appeals. 
See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-37 and 38 (1986). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff brought a negligence action against Delta 
Valley Foods (DVF), John C. Durfee, Larry Howell, ABCO 
Construction Corp. and Utah Power & Light2 for injuries 
suffered when he came in contact with a 7200-volt high-tension 
power line in the course of his employment installing a rain 
gutter on DVF' s warehouse. The District Court entered summary 
judgment in favor of DVF, Durfee and Howell, concluding that 
the power line constituted an open and obvious danger and, 
accordingly, that these defendants owed no duty to Donahue. 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the application of 
the open and obvious danger rule, resulting in an absolute bar 
to recovery, was inappropriate and inconsistent with the 
Comparative Negligence Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Donahue was injured on August 18, 1982 when, while 
installing rain gutter on DVF's warehouse, he came in contact 
with a 7200-volt power line which crossed over the warehouse 
construction site just a few feet above the building's 
rooftop. (R. 3-5; 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.) As a result of 
the electrocution, Donahue fell from the roof approximately 25 
to 30 feet to the ground. Donahue sustained both 
electrocution- and fall-related injuries. Id. 
2
 Plaintiff has settled with Utah Power & Light and ABCO; 
consequently they are not parties to this appeal. 
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Defendant Larry Howell, a steel building salesman, had 
been hired by DVF, through its general manager, defendant 
Durfee, to arrange the construction of the warehouse. (R. 663, 
pp. 26-28, 31-33, 39-41; 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.) Howell 
procured the necessary building materials and arranged for a 
contractor, ABCO Construction Corporation, to erect the 
warehouse. (R. 663, pp. 64-65; 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 65.) 
Near the completion of the warehouse erection, Donahue's 
employer, Mr. Rain Gutter, was retained to install guttering to 
promote appropriate water drainage from the roof. Id. 
As noted above, the District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of DVF, Durfee and Howell on the basis that 
they owed no duty to warn Donahue or otherwise protect him from 
the power line, as it constituted an open and obvious danger. 
(118 Utah Adv. Rep. 65.) The Court of Appeals reversed, 
determining that the open and obvious danger rule was an 
anachronism in the context of Utah's comparative negligence 
statute. (118 Utah Adv. Rep. 67). Defendant Howell now seeks 
a writ of certiorari to this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant Howell contends that the Court of Appeals 
decision is contrary to this Court's decision in Ellertson v. 
Dansie. 576 P.2d 867 (Utah 1978). In actuality, the Ellertson 
court did not state that the open and obvious danger rule 
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removed any duty on the part of the possessor of land. Rather, 
the court stated that "[wjhere there is a dangerous condition 
on one's property, which is just as observable to an invitee as 
to the owner, the owner has no duty to warn or to protect the 
invitee except to observe the universal standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances." 576 P.2d at 868 (emphasis 
added; footnote omitted). Although ambiguous, that language 
suggests that rather than having no duty at all, the duty is 
that suggested by appellant herein and the Court of Appeals 
below, that of reasonable care under the circumstances. 
Further, a careful reading of the Ellertson case 
reveals that the decision was based not on the presence or 
absence of a duty, but on the issue of proximate cause. The 
court held that the plaintiff's conduct was "a later occurring, 
independent and intervening cause of his injury," and that 
there was %tno basis upon which it could reasonably be found 
that any negligence on the part of the defendants was a_ 
proximate cause thereof." Id. (emphasis added). That the 
court's decision turned on proximate cause rather than duty is 
confirmed in the concluding paragraph, where the court stated 
". . .we are not persuaded to disagree with the determination 
made by the trial court that there is no basis upon which it 
could be shown that any negligence of the defendants was a 
5236 j 
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direct, or immediate, or proximate, cause of the plaintiff's 
injury." Id. 
Reference to the open and obvious danger rule 
generally relates back to Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Co., 16 Utah 2d 127, 396 P.2d 751, 753-4 (1964), where 
the court stated: "Where the hazardous condition is as easily 
observable to the invitee as to the owner, the duty to warn 
does not exist . . . ." Id. at 753. However, that case was 
decided under the contributory negligence system, where any 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, 
regardless of how great or slight, served as a complete bar to 
plaintiff's recovery. As the Court of Appeals in this case 
noted, under a contributory negligence scheme it made little 
difference whether a known or obvious condition excused a land 
possessor's duty or simply insulated the possessor from 
liability for any breach of that duty. Donahue v. Durfee, 118 
Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 66, citing Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 
Idaho 649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1118-19 (Ct. App. 1983), aff'd on 
other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 1208 (1984). 
However, Utah has now abandoned its contributory 
negligence system in favor of a comparative negligence system, 
118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 66; Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-38 (1973 and 
1987). Interpreting the open and obvious danger rule to 
obviate a landowner's duty effectively resurrects the complete 
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bar to recovery sought to be alleviated by the adoption of a 
comparative negligence system. Just as this Court has declined 
to retain "all or nothing" doctrines such as assumption of the 
risk, last clear chance and discovered peril, see, Dixon v. 
Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982), and Moore v. Burton 
Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 871 (Utah 1981); see also, 
Donahue, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 67, so the Court of Appeals 
correctly determined that the open and obvious danger rule 
should not be retained as an absolute bar to recovery. 
While there is language in Moore suggesting that there 
is no duty to warn of an obvious danger, 631 P.2d 868, the 
court in Moore was not required to address this issue since it 
determined that the hazard was not obvious. Id. As the Court 
of Appeals noted below, had the court in Moore addressed the 
issue, it almost certainly would have determined that there 
were no significant differences between the open and obvious 
danger rule and the assumption of risk doctrine which the court 
there abandoned; had it considered both it likely would have 
abandoned both under the comparative negligence system. See 
Donahue, 118 Utah Adv. Rep. at 68, n.3. 
The Court of Appeals decision below is correct, well 
reasoned, and consistent with the direct holdings of this Court 
issued since the adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act. 
Since the Court of Appeals decision is correct and appropriate, 
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and is consistent with the status of the law since the adoption 
of the Comparative Negligence Act, it is unnecessary to grant 
certiorari in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals decision is correct and well 
reasoned and should not be disturbed. Defendant Howell's 
petition for writ of certiorari should be denied and the case 
permitted to return to the District Court for further 
disposition without additional delay. 
Dated this 30th day of November, 1989, 
GIAUQUE, WILLIAMS, WILCOX 
St BENDINGER 
W. Brent Wilcox (A3464) 
Edward B. fiavas (A1425) 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On this 30th day of November, 1989, four true copies 
of the foregoing Opposition to Petition for Certiorari were 
sent by first-class mail with postage thereon fully prepaid to 
Robert B. Hansen, Esq. 
838 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Darwin C. Hansen, Esq. 
110 West Center 
Bountiful, Utah 84101 
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DARWIN C. HANSEN, #2058 
Attorney for Defendants Durfee and 
Delta Valley- Foods 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone*: (801) 295-2391 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
i-ATRICK R. DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH POWER AND LIGHT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; JOHN C. 
DURFEE, DELTA VALLEY FOODS, 
a Utah corporation; LARRY 
HOWELL, ABCO CONSTRUCTION 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation 
Defendants. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SANDY CITY CORPORATION, EUGENE 
STRICKLAND and DARRELL MARTIN, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
AMENDED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS 
AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS 
JOHN C. DURFEE AND DELTA 
VALLEY FOODS 
Civil No. C84-4449 
Honorable Pat B. Brian 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on Wednesday, the 14th day of October, 1987, 
pursuant to Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants John 
C. Durfee and Delta Valley Foods, a Utah corporation, herein 
APPENDIX 1 
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jointly referred to as "Durfee", the Honorable Pat B. Brian, 
judge, presiding. All parties appeared through their respective 
counsel of record. Counsel for Durfee argued the Motion which 
was responded to by counsel for Plaintiff. The Court, having 
reviewed the file, considered oral argument, and now being fully 
advised in the premises, makes and enters its uncontroverted: 
FINDINGS OF MATERIAL FACT 
1. Plaintiff was aware of the power lines above Durfeefs 
building. 
2. Plaintiff knew that the power lines were extremely 
dangerous and could cause severe injuries if touched. 
3. Plaintiff had learned about electricity in school and on 
the job. 
4. The risk of harm from the power lines was obvious to 
Plaintiff. 
5. Plaintiff's employer was warned of the power lines by 
Durfee on the day of the accident when he pointed to the lines 
and said: 
"I don't know anything about electricity, but 
if it were me, I don't think I would climb up 
on that ladder." 
6. Plaintiff was warned by his employer to be careful and 
not touch the wires. 
7. Plaintiff warned a fellow employee of the dangers of the 
lines. 
From the foregoing Findings of Material Fact, the Court 
makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff was an invitee on Durfee1s property. 
2. The power lines constituted an obvious danger of which 
Plaintiff was aware. 
3. Durfee had no duty to warn Plaintiff of the obvious 
power line danger. 
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4. If such a duty existed, it was discharged when Durfee 
warned Plaintifffs employer. 
From the foregoing Findings of Uncontroverted Material Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the Court makes and enters its Judgment, 
as follows: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Durfee is 
granted a "No Cause of-Action" Judgment against Plaintiff, 
together with costs• 
DATED this \2^ day of November, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
(7 
" 
FAT B. BRIAN 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
::> \ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
H. D I A O N H I M D L E Y 
^ 7 > CLERK/r 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 6f^>therk 
foregoing AMENDED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND ORDERC GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANTS JOHN C. DURFEE AND DELTA VALLEY 
FOODS, to the following-n^ntj^U individual via first-class mail, 
postage prepaid on this <5p^^aay of October, 1987: 
Paul H. Proctor, Esq. 
Utah Power & Light Company 
P. 0. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
R. Scott Williams, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth* Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert B. Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
320 South Fifth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
W. Brent Wilcox, Esq. 
Giauque & Williams 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Randall E. Grant, Esq. 
Grant & Grant 
340 South Second East, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
w^-
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Robert B. Hansen A-1344 
Attorney for Defendant, Larry Howell 
320 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801) 322-5804 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICK C. DONAHUE, : FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
Plaintiff, : JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT 
LARRY HOWELL 
vs. : 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, : 
a Utah Corporation, JOHN C. 
DURFEE, DELTA VALLEY FOODS, : 
a Utah Corporation, LARRY HOWELL, 
ABCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, : 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, : Civil No. C84-4449 
vs. : Judge Pat B. Brian 
SANDY CITY CORPORATION, EUGENE 
STRICKLAND, and DARRELL MARTIN, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on Wednesday, the 14th day of October, 1987, 
pursuant to Mbtion for Summary Judgement filed by Defendant Larry 
Howell, the Honorable PAT B, BRIAN, judge presiding. All parties 
appeared through their respective counsel of record. Counsel of 
i 
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Howell argued the Motion which was responded to by counsel for 
Plaintiff. The Court, having reviewed the file, considered oral 
argument, and now being fully advised in the premises, makes and 
enters its uncontroverted: 
FINDINGS £F MATERIAL FACT 
1. The subject power lines constituted an open, obvious, 
and plain-to-be-seen danger of which Plaintiff was fully aware. 
2. Plaintiff was adequately warned of the power line danger 
through his employer Eugene Strickland. 
From the foregoing Findings of Material Fact, the Court 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Howell's Motion for summary Judgment should be granted as a 
matter of law because: 
1. Howell had no duty running in favor of Plaintiff in that 
the subject power lines constituted an open arid obvious hazard; and 
2. In the alternative, even if the power lines did not 
constitute an open and obvious hazard, Plaintiff was adequately 
warned of the danger by his employer Eugene Strickland. 
From the foregoing Findings of [Incontroverted Material Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, the Court makes and enters its Order, as 
follows: 
ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Howell is 
granted a "no cause of action" judgment against Plaintiff, together 
with costs. 
Dated this / j) day of December, 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
/ 
-^ . 
PAT B. BRIAN 
District Judge 
J -r .-4„. zv. 
\ _^T^Ol(Ja^ MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings, Conclusions and Order Granting Summary Judgment 
to Defendant Howell, to the following-named individual by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid on this 2.**«f day of December, 1987. 
Paul H. Proctor, 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 899 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
R. Scott Williams 
Attorney at Law 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Darwin C. Hansen 
Attorney at Law 
110 West Center Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
W. Brent Wilcox 
Attorney at Law 
500 Kearns Building 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
r^? ^ L / 
Robert B. Hansen 
64 Territorial Savings & Loan Assoc, v. Baird 118lJtafa Adv Rep. 57 
CODE•CO 
Provo. Utah 
15. See generally In re Independent Clearing House 
Co., 77 Bankr. 843, 868 (D. Utah 1987); United 
States v. Gleneagies Inv. Co., 565 F. Supp. 556, 574 
(D. Pa. 1983); Smith v. Whitman, 39 NJ. 397, 189 
A.2d 15, 20 (1963). See also Comment, Good Faith 
and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 495 
(1983). 
16. Although transactions between family members 
do not, by themselves, render a transaction fraud-
ulent, Utah courts, nonetheless, have often declared 
that the transactions must be closely scrutinized. See, 
e.g., Wed J. Bowman Co. v. White, 13 Utah 2d 
173, 369 P.2d 962, 963 (1962); Civan v. Lambeth, 
10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P 2d 959, 962 (1960); Paxron v. 
Paxron, 80 Utah 540,15 P.2d 1051,1056 (1932). 
17. Cf. Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P 2d 
956, 957 (Utah 1987) (issues deemed tried by consent 
of the parties); Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Wick 
Constr. Co., 680 P 2d 1100, 1103 n.l (Ak. 1984) 
(findings and conclusions demonstrate the issues 
were litigated); Quilhn v Hesston Corp., 230 Kan. 
591, 640 P.2d 1195, 1196 (1982) (issue was consid-
ered by trial court even though not specifically 
raised by the parties). 
18. See Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423. 519 P 2d 
236, 239 (1974); In re Grooms, 13 Bankr. 376, 379-
83 (D. Utah 1981). See also Koch Eng'g Co. v. 
Faulconer, 239 Kan. 101, 716 P.2d 180, 185 (1986). 
Once again, as one of its principal arguments on 
appeal, TSL contends that the trial court improperly 
allocated the parties' respective burdens of proof. 
TSL claims that a plaintiff may create a presump-
tion of fraudulent intent by establishing the presence 
of badges of fraud. Once this occurs, TSL asserts 
that the defendant then bears the burden of proof to 
rebut such a presumption. Although it is arguably a 
matter of semantics, we find the more accurate ter-
minology is that once a plaintiff establishes by cir-
cumstantial evidence or otherwise, an inference that 
the defendant harbored actual intent to defraud, the 
burden of coming forward with rebuttal evidence, 
not the burden of proof, shifts to the defendant. Com-
pare Koch, 716 P 2d at 186, with In re 
Grooms, 13 Bankr. at 383. 
19. See, e.g., Gabaig v. Gabaig, 717 P 2d 835, 838 
(Ak. 1986); Gifford-Hill & Co. v. Stoller, 221 
Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625, 630 (1986) (provided by 
statute). 
20. Dahnken Inc. of Salt Lake City v. Wilmanh, 
726 P.2d 420, 423 (Utah 1986) (quoting Givan v. 
Lambeth, 10 Utah 2d 287, 351 P.2d 959, 962 
(I960)). See also Boccalero v. Bee, 102 Utah 12, 126 
P.2d 1063, 1065 (1942). 
21. Montana Nat'l Bank v. Michels, 631 P 2d 1260, 
1263 (Mont. 1981)(quoting Humbird v. Arnet, 99 
Mont. 499, 44 P 2d 756, 761 (1935)). 
22. Id. (citing 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraudulent Convey-
ances §10 at 701 (1968)). See also Gabaig v, 
Gabaig, 1\1 P.2d 835, 839 (Ak. 1986); Koch, 716 
P 2d at 184; Moms v. Holland, 529 S.W 2d 948, 
953 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Gifford-Hill <fe Co. v. 
Stoller, 221 Neb. 757, 380 N.W.2d 625, 630(1986). 
23. Cf. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. 
Ins. Underwriters, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 211, 398 P.2d 
685, 688 (1965); Conder v. A.L. Williams <k 
Assocs., Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 637 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987) (both cases reverse summary judgments in 
fraud cases on the basis of material issues of fact). 
Cite as 
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Patrick R. DONAHUE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
John C. DURFEE; Delta Valley Foods, a 
Utah corporation; Larry Howell; Utah Power 
& Light Company, a Utah corporation; ABCO 
Construction Corp., a Utah corporation, 
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Third District, Salt Lake County 
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ATTORNEYS. 
W. Brent Wilcox and Edward B. Havas, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for 
Respondents John C. Durfee and Delta 
Valley Foods 
Robert B. Hansen, Salt Lake City, for 
Respondent Larry Howell 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Orme. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff Patrick Donahue appeals the dist-
rict court's entry of summary judgment in 
favor of defendants Delta Valley Foods 
("DVF"), j 0 [ m Durfee, and Larry Howell. 
Donahue filed this negligence action seeking to 
recover damages for injuries he suffered when 
he contacted an electrical power line while 
installing a rain gutter on DVF's warehouse. 
The district court concluded the power line 
constituted an open and obvious danger and, 
accordingly, DVF, Durfee, and Howell owed 
no duty to warn Donahue of the danger or 
otherwise protect him from it. We reverse and 
remand. 
FACTS 
Summary judgment is proper only where 
"there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ, P. 
56(c). "In reviewing a summary judgment, we 
analyze the facts and inferences in a light most 
favorable to the losing party." Copper State 
Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture 
Co., 770 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Accordingly, we set forth the facts as conte-
nded by Donahue. 
John Durfee, DVF's general manager, hired 
Larry Howell, a steel building salesman, to 
organize the construction of a new warehouse 
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS 
APPENDIX 3 
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for DVF. Howell's duties included procuring 
the necessary building materials and locating a 
suitable contractor. With Durfee's consent, 
Howell hired ABCO Construction Corp. to 
erect the warehouse. 
By spring of 1982, the warehouse was 
mostly complete and Howell hired "Mr. Rain 
Gutter," Donahue's employer, to install a 
gutter to promote proper water drainage. On 
August 18, 1982, Donahue was assigned to 
assist with the DVF warehouse project. 
Donahue was required to work from atop the 
warehouse roof, where a 7200 volt high-
tension power line operated by Utah Power 
and Light loomed approximately four to five 
feet overhead. Apparently, Donahue stood up 
during the gutter's installation and the top of 
his head struck the power line, causing a 
severe electrical shock and his resulting fall 
from the warehouse roof. Donahue was not 
warned about the powerline but saw it and 
perceived the potentially fatal danger which it 
posed. 
In July of 1984, Donahue brought this 
negligence action against DVF, Durfee, 
Howell, ABCO, and Utah Power and Light.1 
DVF, Durfee, and Howell moved for 
summary judgment, contending they owed no 
duty to warn Donahue or otherwise protect 
him from the power line as it constituted an 
open and obvious danger. See, e.g., Steele v. 
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R., 16 Utah 2d 
127, 396 P.2d 751, 753-54 (1964). The dist-
rict court agreed and entered summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants. 
Donahue-appeals, advancing several related 
arguments. However, the dispositive issue on 
appeal is whether the open and obvious danger 
rule is an absolute bar to Donahue's action 
under Utah's comparative negligence system. 
We hold that even assuming the power line 
was an open and obvious danger, Donahue is 
nonetheless entitled to have the finder of fact 
compare his negligence, if any, in encounte-
ring the power line with any negligence attri-
butable to the defendants in creating or allo-
wing such a dangerous condition to exist. 
We first address this issue as it pertains to 
Donahue's claim against DVF based on its 
ownership of the warehouse. 
TRADITIONAL APPROACH TO 
LANDOWNER LIABILITY 
Historically, a landowner's duty of care 
owing to persons entering his or her land 
varied with the nature of the visit. See, e.g., 
Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 441 (Utah 
1979). Bur see Williams v. Meiby, 699 P.2d 
723, 726 (Utah 1985) (abandoning the traditi-
onal common law distinctions and instead 
imposing a duty of "reasonable care in ail 
circumstances," at least toward the lando-
wner's tenant). Accord English v. Kienke, 114 
P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Gregory 
v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 754 P.2d 
89, 91 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Under the trad-
itional view a landowner has no duty to warn 
guests of "open and obvious dangers," regar-
dless of the purpose of the visit. See, e.g., 
Ellertson v. Dansie, 576' P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 
1978); Steele, 396 P.2d at 753-54. This doc-
trine is commonly known as the open and 
obvious danger rule, and it precludes an 
injured guest's recovery against the landowner 
for any injuries sustained through encounte-
ring an obvious risk. The justification for the 
rule appears to be that encountering an 
obvious risk is negligence as a matter of law 
and, at least under a contributory negligence 
system, a plaintiff who is even only slightly 
negligent is barred from recovery. An altern-
ative justification is that while a landowner 
has a duty to warn guests of dangers on his or 
her property, the landowner's failure to do so 
is harmless where the danger is readily appa-
rent. 
The open and obvious danger rule has been 
sharply criticized. An often-cited basis for 
attack is that the rule establishes the lando-
wner's duty of care according to what is 
known or should be known by the guest. See, 
e.g., Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 105 Idaho 
649, 671 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Ct. App. 1983), afPd 
on other grounds, 107 Idaho 593, 691 
P.2d 1208 (1984). These critics argue that a 
more logical approach treats the guest's kno-
wledge of obvious danger as bearing only on 
the reasonableness of the guest's subsequent 
conduct, not as relieving the landowner of its 
duty of care. See, e.g., Keller, 671 P.2d at 
1117 (the open and obvious danger rule does 
not differentiate between those facts relevant 
to the landowner's duty of care and those 
facts establishing a total or partial defense to 
liability); Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 
S.W.2d 512, 521 (Tex. 1978) ("A plaintiffs 
knowledge, whether it is derived from a 
warning or from the facts, even if the facts 
display the danger openly and obviously, is a 
matter that bears upon [plaintiffs] own neg-
ligence; it should not affect the defendant's 
duty."). 
Others have criticized the open and obvious 
danger rule for ignoring reality. As the Texas 
Supreme Court observed, 
[tjhere are many instances in which 
a person of ordinary prudence may 
prudently take a risk about which 
he knows, or has been warned 
about, or that is open and obvious 
to him .... One's conduct after he 
is possessed of full knowledge, 
under the circumstances may be 
justified or deemed negligent depe-
nding on such things as the plain-
tiffs status, the nature of the str-
ucture, the urgency or lack of it for 
attempting to reach a destination, 
the availability of an alternative, 
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one's familiarity or lack of it with 
the way, the degree and seriousness 
of the danger, the availability of aid 
from others, the nature and degree 
of darkness, the kind and extent of 
a warning, and the precautions 
taken under the circumstances.... 
Farter, 565 S.W.2d at 520. See Keller, 671 
P.2d at 1117. Courts subscribing to this view 
have either completely abandoned the open 
and obvious danger rule, as did Texas in Parker, 
or, at a minimum, refuse to" apply the 
rule as an absolute bar in actions brought by 
plaintiffs who, like Donahue, entered the 
property in connection with their employment 
duties. See, e.g., Napoli v. Hellenic Lines, 
Ltd., 536 F.2d 505, 509 (2nd Cir. 1976) (a 
vessel owner must anticipate that a longshor-
eman may voluntarily encounter an obvious 
danger to avoid losing his job); Brown v. 
Martin Marietta Corp., 690 P.2d 889, 892 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (where an employee's 
duty renders an obvious danger unavoidable, 
injured employee is not barred as a matter of 
law from recovery against landowner); Shannon 
v. Howard S. Wright Constr. Co., 
181 Mont. 269, 593 P.2d 438, 440-41 (1979) 
(where an employee must either forego empl-
oyment or encounter danger, the obviousness 
of the danger will not completely bar the 
employee's recovery for any resulting injury). 
A related approach is articulated in the 
Restatement (Second) of Tons (1965). Section 
343A provides that a landowner is not liable 
for a guest's injuries resulting from an open 
and obvious danger unless the landowner 
"should anticipate the harm despite such 
knowledge or obviousness." A few jurisdict-
ions, apparently including Utah, have seen 
merit in this approach. See, e.g., Whitman v. 
W.T. Grant Co., 16 Utah 2d 81, 395 P.2d 
918, 920 (1964) ("In order to justify holding 
that a jury question as to negligence exists, 
where injury has resulted from an observable 
hazard, it is essential that there be something 
which could be regarded as tending to distract 
the [injured person's] attention or to prevent 
him from seeing the danger ...."); Santos v. 
Scindia Steam Navigation Co., 598 F.2d 480 
(9th Cir. 1979) (applying Restatement appr-
oach under Jones Act), afVd, 451 U.S. 156 
(1981); Scales v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 
Co., 2 Kan. App. 2d 491, 582 P.2d 300, 306 
(1978) (a landowner may be liable for injuries 
suffered by a worker encountering an obvio-
usly dangerous condition during periods of 
foreseeable distraction). 
Thus, the open and obvious danger rule is 
not beyond reproach even within the contrib-
utory negligence system from which it arose. 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND 
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK 
Utah has now abandoned its contributory 
negligence system. Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
38 (1987), entitled "Comparative Negligence," 
provides in part that *[t]he fault of a person 
seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery 
by that person* He may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault 
exceeds his own." Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
37(2) defines "fault" as "any actionable breach 
of legal duty ... including, but not limited to, 
negligence in all its degrees, contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk, ...." We hold 
that by enacting the above statutory provisions 
and establishing a comparative negligence 
system, the Utah Legislature has by necessary 
implication abolished the open and obvious 
danger rule as an absolute bar to an injured 
guest's recovery. Our conclusion is premised* 
on two grounds. 
First, the open and obvious danger rule is 
fundamentally incompatible with a compara-
tive negligence scheme, which requires the 
finder of fact to allocate liability for an injury 
based on the relative responsibility of the 
parties involved. The adoption of a compar-
ative negligence system amounts to an expre-
ssion by the Legislature that the harsh and 
inflexible result of total victory or unconditi-
onal defeat compelled by the traditional con-
tributory negligence system, including the open 
and obvious danger rule, is no longer accept-
able. As most convincingly articulated by 
Judge Burnett for the Idaho Court of 
Appeals, 
[pjrior to the jidvent of comparative 
negligence, contributory negligence 
was an absolute bar to recovery. 
Thus, it made little difference 
whether a known or obvious cond-
ition excused a land possessor's 
duty to an invitee, or simply insul-
ated the possessor from liability for 
any breach of such duty. But under 
the comparative negligence system, 
the difference is profound. If duty 
is not excused by a known or 
obvious danger, the injured invitee 
might recover, albeit in a dimini-
shed amount, if his negligence in 
encountering the risk is found to be 
less than the land possessor's neg-
ligence in allowing the dangerous 
condition or activity on his prop-
erty. In contrast, if the invitee's 
voluntary encounter with a known 
or obvious danger were deemed to 
excuse the landowner's duty, then 
there would be no negligence to 
compare- -and , therefore , no 
recovery. The effect would be to 
resurrect contributory negligence as 
an absolute bar to recovery in cases 
involving a land possessor's liability 
to invitees. 
Keller, 671 P.2d at 1118-19. See also 
O'Donnell v. City of Casper, 696 P.2d 1278, 
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1281-82 (Wyo. 1985). While the Idaho 
Supreme Court did not immediately embrace 
Judge Burnett's entire analysis, see Keller v. 
Holiday Inns, Inc., 107 Idaho 593, 691 P.2d 
1208, 1210-11 (1984) (limiting the basis for 
court of appeals holding), the court ultimately 
adopted that view and abandoned the open 
and obvious danger rule altogether, citing its 
incompatibility with Idaho's comparative 
negligence system. See Harrison v. Taylor, 115 
Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1989). In 
abandoning the traditional rule, the court 
noted that *[w]e recognize the role stare 
decisis plays in the judicial process. But we are 
not hesitant to reverse ourselves when a doc-
trine ..'has proven over time to be unjust or 
unwise." Id. at 1328. We are likewise convi-
nced that the open and obvious danger rule is 
incompatible with Utah's comparative negli-
gence system and join Idaho and a number of 
other states in announcing its abandonment.2 
See, e.g., Cox v. J.C. Penney Co., 741 
S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1987) (en banc); Woolston v. 
Wells, 297 Or. 548, 687 P.2d 144 (1984); Parker, 
565 S.W.2d at 517; O'Donnell, 696 
P.2d at 1284. 
Our second point of analysis is premised 
upon the fact that the assumption of risk 
doctnne has been expressly abandoned in Utah 
as a complete bar to recovery due to its inco-
mpatibility with our comparative negligence 
system. See Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) 
(1987). See also Moore v. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 870 (Utah 1981);* 
Jacobsen Constr. Co. v. Structo-Lite 
Eng'g, Inc., 619 P 2d 306, 309 (Utah 1980). Ac-
cord Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 
P.2d 1191, 1193-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). It 
would defy rationality to maintain the open 
and obvious danger rule as a complete bar to 
recovery where the essentially indistinguishable 
assumption of risk doctnne no longer compels 
such a result. See, e.g., Harrison, 768 P 2d at 
1325 (open and obvious danger rule is a cor-
ollary to the assumption of risk doctnne and 
should likewise be abandoned); Parker, 565 
S.W.2d at 518 (assumption of risk doctrine is 
inseparable from the open and obvious danger 
rule). See also Utah Code Ann. §78-27-
37(2) (1987) (defining "fault" for purposes of 
the comparative negligence scheme as inclu-
ding "assumption of risk" and "negligence in 
all its degrees"). 
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted section 78-27-37(2) to abolish 
the last clear chance doctnne as a complete 
bar to recovery. 
It is widely recognized that such 
doctnnes as assumption of risk, last 
clear chance, and discovered peril 
resemble the old contributory neg-
ligence doctrine in that they are "ail 
or nothing" doctrines in terms of 
recovery by the plaintiff ... 
UTAH 
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(T]here seem to be no good 
reasons to retain [the last clear 
chance] doctnne which was ongin-
aily devised because of another 
doctrine, i.e., contnbutory neglig-
ence, which the state of Utah has 
statutonly abolished as an absolute 
bar to recovery. 
Dixon v. Stewart, 658 P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 
1982) (emphasis added). We likewise find no 
good reasons to retain the open and obvious 
danger rule as an absolute bar to recovery. 
The summary judgment against Donahue and 
in favor of DVF must accordingly be reversed.4 
JUDGMENT AGAINST OTHER 
DEFENDANTS 
Lastly, we address the summary judgment in 
favor of Durfee and Howell. Donahue's claim 
against these two defendants is based on their 
roles in procunng and supervising the constr-
uction of the DVF warehouse, including allo-
wing the active power line to remain so near 
the warehouse roof while Donahue worked. 
Apparently, the only basis for summary jud-
gment in their favor was the open and obvious 
nature of the danger posed by the power line. 
As we held above, the mere obviousness of 
danger does not support summary judgment 
under these facts, and it must also be reversed 
as to both Durfee and Howell. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the summary judgment and 
remand this matter for tnal or such other 
proceedings as may be appropnate consistent 
with this opinion. At tnal, the finder of fact 
must compare the reasonableness of 
Donahue's conduct under all the circumsta-
nces in encountenng the power line with the 
reasonableness of DVF's, Durfee's, and 
Howell's conduct in creating and allowing the 
potentially deadly power line to remain so 
near the warehouse roof, in an activated state, 
while work was being done on the roof. If any 
damages are warranted under this analysis, 
they must be awarded consistent with Utah 
Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1987), as discussed 
above. The parties will bear their own costs of 
this appeal. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. Donahue entered into settlements with ABCO and 
Utah Power and Light, and they are not parties to 
this appeal. 
2. The middle ground taken by the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Keller, namely that ot recognizing an exc-
eption for injured employees rather than rejecting 
outright the open and obvious danger doctnne, is 
not without attraction as a more cautious and con-
servative approach to the law's development. 
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However, there is no defensible basis for making 
such fine distinctions in view of our conclusion that 
the open and obvious danger rule, at least as a total 
bar to liability, has been legislatively washed away 
with the enactment in this state of a comparative 
negligence scheme. And as discussed in the text, the 
Idaho court reached this very conclusion in Harrison 
only five years after its decision in Keller. 
3. In Moore, 631 P.2d at 868, the Utah Supreme 
Court also held the defendant landowner was enti-
tled to a jury instruction that he has no duty to 
warn a business invitee of an obvious danger, but 
the failure to give such an instruction under the 
particular facts was held to be harmless error. This 
result does cast doubt on the propriety of our con-
clusion here. While our Supreme Court recognized 
in Moore that the assumption of risk doctrine has 
been abandoned as a complete bar to recovery under 
sections 78-27-37 and-38, it failed to consider 
the effect of those provisions on the open and 
obvious danger rule, most likely because that point 
was not argued by the panics. 631 P.2d at 870. We 
believe that had the parties in Moore analyzed the 
open and obvious danger rule in this light, the 
Court would have held that there are no significant 
differences between it and the assumption of risk 
doctrine, abandoning both under our comparative 
negligence system. 
4. Our decision in this case will no doubt narrow 
somewhat the range of cases involving landowner 
liability in which summary judgment will be appro-
priate. However, summary judgment will still be 
available, even though the landowner will be unable 
to take refuge behind the open and obvious danger 
doctrine, in situations where the landowner establi-
shes undisputed facts showing he was not negligent 
as a matter of law. Such situations include plaintiffs 
who are solely responsible for creating the dange-
rous condition on defendant's land. E.g., English v. 
Kicnkc, 774 P.2d 1154,1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
Th)is matter is before the court on three 
motions for summary disposition: the court's 
sua sponte motion, the Employers' Reinsur-
ance Fund's motion and the Workers' Com-
pensation Fund's motion. The Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund and the Workers' -Compe-
nsation Fund both move to dismiss the appeal 
on the ground that it was not timely filed. 
Petitioner concedes that the appeal should be 
dismissed, but urges the court to dismiss the 
appeal due to lack of a final order. 
The Industrial Commission's order from 
which this appeal is taken adopts the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's (A.L.J.) findings of fact 
but remands for a determination of whether 
petitioner should receive his medical expenses 
relating to his 1985 injury. Thus, the disposi-
tive issue is whether the Commission's order is 
a final appealable order. 
Generally, "[a)n appeal can be taken only 
from entry of a final judgment which wholly 
disposes of a claim against a party." Hase v. 
Hase, 775 P.2d 943, 944 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-14 (Supp. 
1988) provides that an aggrieved party may 
obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is 
expressly prohibited by statute. The statute 
further states that a party may seek judicial 
review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies and shall file a petition for judicial 
review of final agency action. Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-46b-14(2)&(3). 
In several jurisdictions courts have recogn-
ized that generally remand orders in adminis-
trative proceedings are not final appealable 
orders.11 We agree that an order of the agency 
is not final so long as it reserves something to 
the agency for further decision. See Maryland 
Comm'n on Human Relations v. Baltimore 
Gas & Elcc., 296 Md. 46, 459 A.2d 205, 212-
13 (1983); Texas Gen. Indem. Co. v. Strait, 
673 S.W.2d 334, 336-37 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984). 
The order in the present case remands to the 
A.L.J, for a determination of whether petiti-
oner should receive his medical expenses rel-
ating to his 1985 injury. Because the order 
reserves something further for the agency to 
determine, we hold that the order of the 
Commission is not a final appealable order. 
Consequently, we dismiss the appeal due to 
lack of junsdiction in accordance with R. 
Utah Ct. App. 10(a)(1). Because we dismiss 
the appeal due to lack of a final order, we 
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